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“You know, when people think about drugs, they’re just disgusted
by it. They just want to lock them up, and throw away the key.
But it’s more complex than that.”
- U.S. President Richard Nixon1
“It is the mission of the Department of Justice to enforce the laws of
the United States, and the previous issuance of guidance
undermines the rule of law and the ability of our local, state, tribal,
and federal law enforcement partners to carry out this mission.”
- U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions2
Given the acrimony of our current political moment,3 it is
hard to imagine a time when a Republican administration and a
Democratic Congress could work together and compromise on key
legislation affecting health, the environment, and criminal
justice.4 And yet, recent developments on drug policy and
criminal justice harken back to this period of legislative
achievement. One of the laws produced in the era that this
symposium is examining—the Controlled Substances Act

1 Interview with Egil “Bud” Krogh, Jr., Frontline, PBS SOCAL (2000), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/krogh.html [http://perma.cc/D4HH-XVCM]
(interviewing Krogh, the White House Deputy for Domestic Affairs under President
Nixon, and his account of Nixon’s view on addiction).
2 THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Justice Department Issues Memo on Marijuana
Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memomarijuana-enforcement [http://perma.cc/8LCS-F3RF] (noting rescission of prior guidance
on prosecuting marijuana felonies).
3 See Lee Rainie et al., Trust and Distrust in America, PEW RES. CTR. 1, 3 (2019),
http://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/6XTZMSMJ] (“Majorities believe the public’s confidence in the U.S. government and in each other
is shrinking, and most believe a shortage of trust in government and in other citizens makes
it harder to solve some of the nation’s key problems.”).
4 David T. Courtwright, The Controlled Substances Act: how a “big tent” reform
became a punitive drug law, 76 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 9, 10–11 (2004) (“Nixon
declared the 1970s to be ‘a great age of reform of the institutions of American government’
and pressed for changes in any number of federal laws, those governing the draft, welfare
system, tax code, revenue sharing, and economic opportunity programs being among the
best-known examples.”) (citation omitted).
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(“CSA”)—shares some similarities in its development with three
pieces of legislation on drug policy and criminal justice that
passed in the last five years.5 The legacy of the CSA certainly
shaped these issues over the last fifty years.
The original intent of the CSA was to be a reform package
that sought to harmonize the country’s approach to drug policy.6
As part of a Nixon-era set of reforms, the CSA was not intended
to be a harsh, punitive approach to drug control; however, in the
intervening years, the CSA lost its original purpose, as political
winds changed in ways that shifted the focus of the CSA toward
more punitive approaches toward this goal.7
Despite the political gridlock currently plaguing our federal
government, Congress has come together under two very different
presidential administrations to pass legislation on substance
abuse and criminal justice reform.8 Indeed, Congress actually
passed legislation focused on the country’s opioid epidemic, not
once, but twice: the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act9
(“CARA”) in 2016, and then the Substance Use-Disorder
Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment
(“SUPPORT”) for Patients and Communities Act10 in 2018. The
relative ease by which Congress passed these two bills, as well as
the more difficult passage of the criminal justice reform bill, the
Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely
Transitioning Every Person (“FIRST STEP”) Act,11 might signal a
policy shift and a political change in our views on drug policy and
criminalization that we have not seen in decades, and could
harken back to returning to the original intent of the CSA of
balancing competing policies in its approach to drug policy.
The surprising break in partisanship to address addiction
policy might strike some as a sign of an opportune time to make
a major reform of the CSA regarding a major public policy
problem posing a conflict between a majority of the states and
the federal government. Many states are considering whether to
legalize marijuana for clinical and non-clinical “recreational”
purposes, and some states already have adopted regulatory
5 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
6 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 10.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 12.
9 Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 130
Stat. 695 (2016).
10 Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for
Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-721, 132 Stat. 3894 (2016).
11 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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schemes for marijuana,12 but the federal regulatory scheme
under the CSA has put states’ ability to legalize marijuana in
question. Fifty years after the passage of the CSA, is it not time
to reconsider how we approach marijuana? Are CARA,
SUPPORT, FIRST STEP, and the changes at the state level
precursors for a change to the CSA in an area that seems to be
overwhelmingly popular?13
The answer to that question might be yes, but I would argue
that the political reality is that reform at the federal level is not
necessarily coming soon—even if the 2020 elections result in
partisan changes in Congress and the federal government.
Instead, I argue that, despite these seemingly monumental bills
in a time of epic dysfunction, there is no fundamental shift in
drug policy at the federal level. This “policy plateau” is evident by
the failure to move legislation to amend the CSA in order to give
states the ability to regulate marijuana.
While states continue to move forward on drug policy, the
conflict with federal law creates conflict in many important policy
areas, including medical practice, banking policy, and taxation.
Having legal and policy clarity by amending the CSA would
provide needed certainty, but several questions still face
advocates and policymakers. Are those recent reforms—CARA,
SUPPORT, and FIRST STEP—a harbinger for reform of the
CSA? How do issues such as class and race play into potential
reforms? Are there potential lessons that can be learned in order
to alter the CSA? Given the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gonzales v. Raich that federal laws such as the CSA still apply
regardless of state regulations, including in the traditional state
sphere of medical professionals’ scope of practice,14 these
questions are important to answer in order to solve the conflict
emerging between states’ movement toward legalization and
federal inaction.
To answer these questions, this Article will analyze the
various aforementioned laws in the context of the current
political environment. First, the Article will provide an overview
of the CSA’s legislative history, particularly looking at the initial
intent of the law against how it was subsequently amended in a
different political climate. Second, the Article will compare the

Courtwright, supra note 4, at 10.
Hannah Hartig & A.W. Geiger, About six-in-ten Americans support marijuana
legalization, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/
08/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/ [http://perma.cc/P75F-V85N].
14 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
12
13
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response to the opioid epidemic to marijuana policy at the state
and federal level. Third, the Article will discuss the legal,
political, and policy conflicts between the opioid legislation and
the failure to pass marijuana legislation at both the state and
federal level. Finally, the Article will conclude that, despite some
advances on bipartisanship reform for drug laws, these small steps
are insufficient to change the law at the federal level to decriminalize
marijuana. The opioids legislation, CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST
STEP, represent different pieces that share some common threads
with the CSA as initially envisioned; however, there are key
differences between the efforts to be explored that could help
advocates and policymakers.
I. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AS THE FIFTY-YEAR-OLD
FOUNDATION FOR MODERN DRUG POLICY
American drug policy includes both regulation of substances
for patient use on the commercial market, as well as interdiction
of substances believed to be dangerous for human consumption or
only consumed for limited purposes under close supervision. This
section provides a brief snapshot of the policy developments that
provide the foundation for our current drug regime.
A. Early Federal Regulatory Efforts Prior to the CSA
During the twentieth century, the federal government
exercised increasing control over drug policy, by regulating the
use of certain drugs through a complex approval process and
supervising medical professionals, and by criminalizing other
drugs as illegal substances.15 In one stream of federalizing drug
policy, Congress began to formalize the process for demonstrating
the safety of prescription drugs starting with the 1906 passage of
the Pure Food and Drugs Act.16 This law, and a series of
subsequent laws, led to the creation of the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), which became seen as “a ‘gatekeeper’ to
protect public health by using its regulatory authority over the
drug approval process.”17 For instance, the FDA began using its
authority to regulate the use of addictive non-narcotic drugs after
the medical community recognized that drugs such as

Courtwright, supra note 4; see also infra SPILLANE note 17.
Oliver J. Kim, Trying and Dying: Are Some Wishes at the End of Life Better Than
Others?, 41 DALHOUSIE L.J. 94, 97 (Spring 2018).
17 Id.; see also JOSEPH F. SPILLANE, Debating the Controlled Substances Act, 76
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 17, 19 (2004) (discussing how federal law “created a class
of drugs available only on a physician’s prescription, and gave the FDA authority to
designate which drugs would be placed in that category”) (citation omitted).
15
16
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“barbiturates were not addicting in the narcotic sense, but that
they were habit forming and subject to improper use.”18
In another stream of federalization, Congress began
addressing the growing concern about the addictive nature of
narcotics, ultimately leading to a process of interdiction and
criminalization.19 Initially, Congress used its tax power to pass
the Harrison Act20 as a means of regulating narcotics (defined as
opioids and cocaine) and, thus, made the Treasury Department
the initial regulator of these substances.21 This statute marked a
substantial shift in regulatory policy, as the states had
principally been the primary regulators by enacting a patchwork
of policies.22
The Treasury Department largely resisted adding additional
non-narcotics to its responsibilities under its Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.23 But the Bureau’s director, Harry Anslinger, did favor
greater criminalization of marijuana at both the state and federal
level.24 Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937, adding
the only non-narcotic drug under the jurisdiction of the Treasury
Department’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics.25 Although the
Marijuana Tax Act was framed as a revenue law to quell
Anslinger’s concerns about the constitutionality of regulating
marijuana, it effectively banned the use of marijuana given the
high cost of the tax.26 Subsequently, Congress went further in the
Boggs Act by adding criminal penalties, including mandatory
minimum sentences for possession and trafficking of marijuana
and narcotics,27 and the federal government encouraged states to
pass similar legislation to standardize drug laws.28

SPILLANE, supra note 17.
Id. at 18.
20 Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
21 SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 18.
22 See Kathleen Ferraiolo, From Killer Weed to Popular Medicine: The Evolution of
American Drug Control Policy, 1937-2000, 19 J. POL’Y HIST. 147, 150 (2007); see also
Courtwright, supra note 4, at 10.
23 SPILLANE, supra note 17.
24 JOSEPH F. SPILLANE & DAVID B. WOLCOTT, A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 233 (2013) (noting that Anslinger “presented marijuana as addictive, a
gateway to more serious drugs like heroin, and a source of crime”); Ferraiolo, supra note
22, at 153–54.
25 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24.
26 Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 154; David Katner, Up in Smoke: Removing
Marijuana from Schedule I, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 167, 173 (2018).
27 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 234. See VIRGINIA L. ROTHWELL, The
Boggs Act in Encyclopedia of Drug Policy 96–97 (Mark Kleiman & James Hawdon, eds.,
2011), for a discussion of how the Boggs Act also marked the first time that marijuana
and narcotics had been combined in legislation.
28 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 234.
18
19
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During the 1960s, there was a growing recognition of
fundamental problems with the differing streams of federal
regulation, as “[n]ew substances were being introduced into
widespread use faster than research could develop and the
traditional addiction model, which had been based on physical
dependence, was not adequate.”29 Instead of providing a unified
response to the patchwork of state policies, “Congress’s habit of
ad hoc legislation, sometimes based on the constitution’s taxing
power and sometimes on its commerce power, had produced a
patchwork of enforcement agencies with different priorities and
resources.”30 The Johnson Administration was unable to
formulate legislation in time for consideration before the 1968
election, resulting in the incoming Nixon Administration
modifying the initial proposals that ultimately became the CSA.31
In 1970, Congress passed the CSA as part of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act32 as an effort to consolidate
these different approaches.33 Policymakers realized the country was
facing “three very visible drug problems”: an increase in heroin use in
urban areas, as well as among service members stationed in
Vietnam, and in young people using marijuana and psychedelics.34
Historians note a difference in political philosophy between the
Democratic majority in Congress and the Nixon Administration
toward criminal justice, but these opposing partisans were able to
merge their differences.35 For instance, “the conventional liberal
wisdom [was] that federal officials had botched the psychotropic
drug problem while demonizing narcotic offenders and
stonewalling maintenance experiments. . . . Above all, the
reformers thought that the old sanctions, especially those
involving marijuana, were unfair and inflexible, and brought
disrepute upon the control system.”36 Key officials in the
administration agreed with that assessment and believed “that
the new guidelines [under the CSA] would make the system
fairer and more workable, while preserving moral distinctions
SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 21.
Courtwright, supra note 4, at 10.
SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 21.
32 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236.
33 SPILLANE, supra note 17.
34 Jerome H. Jaffe, One Bite of the Apple: Establishing the Special Action Office for
Drug Abuse Prevention, 43, 45 in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN (David Musto ed., 2002).
35 For a video discussing how President Nixon had to work with Democrats in order to
govern, see Bridging The Branches—How President Nixon Worked With A Democratic Congress,
RICHARD NIXON FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.nixonfoundation.org/2018/04/bridgingbranches-president-nixon-worked-democratic-congress/ [http://perma.cc/V7RS-733P].
36 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 12.
29
30
31
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among casual users, addicts, and organized criminal traffickers,
with the heaviest sentences reserved for the latter.”37
Conversely, the Nixon Administration deemed drug abuse a
priority issue because “the problem was getting out of hand.”38
Nixon himself believed that drug misuse and addiction was a
cause of crime, and he had campaigned on reducing the supply
side of this equation.39 Thus, the administration had determined
that the existing legal authorities were inadequate and needed to
be replaced with a single modern law that would give the
government the appropriate tools and flexibility in order to combat
this problem.40
Recognizing the need to compromise with the more liberal
“establishment”41 in Congress, President Nixon’s submission to
Congress, which became the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act, reflected a compromise between
interdiction and public health approaches to drug control:
When Nixon submitted his drug bill to Congress in July 1969, he
outlined a 10-point action plan. Characteristically, points 1–5 dealt
with supply control. Points 6–10 emphasized education, research,
rehabilitation, training, and communication. The legislation itself
reflected this multi-front approach. The CSA was part (Titles II and
III) of . . . the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970. Title I provided authority and money for the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to mount additional
prevention and treatment efforts through community mental health
centers and public health service hospitals. It authorized the National
Institute of Mental Health to increase research and training. It
protected the privacy rights of subjects under the care of approved
researchers. All of these were unmistakably public-health initiatives,
part of the same legislation as the CSA.42

B. The CSA and the Scheduling of Drugs
At the heart of the CSA is its regulatory scheme for
classifying drugs under five different schedules. The CSA
initially classified certain drugs under these schedules, with
marijuana being included under Schedule I.43 The Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) within the Justice
Department can add additional drugs to the schedule as a
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(d)(1).

Do Not Delete

2020]

5/22/20 8:52 AM

Original Intent

135

“controlled substance.”44 Schedule I is the most restrictive
category and reserved for substances with no medical value, with
Schedule V being the least restrictive.45 In order to be classified
as a Schedule I controlled substance, the DEA must find that the
drug has a high potential for abuse,46 there is no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,47 and
“[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other
substance under medical supervision.”48 The CSA allows the
Attorney General to reclassify a controlled substance to a lower
schedule or completely remove the substance in question.49 But
as a political compromise,50 the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) or “any interested party” can petition
for adding, reclassifying, or removing a drug from the schedule,
just as the Attorney General could on “his own motion.”51
Since the CSA initially classified marijuana under Schedule
I, there have been five petitions to reschedule it—all unsuccessful
and often lengthy.52 As part of a 2016 denial, the DEA laid out a
five-part test to determine whether a drug has an accepted
medical use, as follows: “[T]he drug’s chemistry is not known and
reproducible; there are no adequate safety studies; there are no
adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy; the drug is
not accepted by qualified experts; and the scientific evidence is

21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
For a useful summary with examples of drugs falling under each of the five
schedules, see Elizabeth Hartney, Controlled Drugs in the Controlled Substance Act,
VERYWELLMIND (Sept. 29, 2019), http://www.verywellmind.com/what-are-controlled-drugs22310 [http://perma.cc/HC5N-MCX6]. Drug schedules are different from the five classes of
drugs—narcotics, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids—that fall
under the CSA. Id.
46 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A).
47 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B).
48 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(C).
49 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
50 SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 22.
51 21 U.S.C. § 811(a). See also 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (explaining that when making this
determination, the DEA must consider eight factors laid out in the CSA: “(1) Its actual or
relative potential for abuse. (2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known.
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance. (4) Its
history and current pattern of abuse. (5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse.
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health. (7) Its psychic or physiological dependence
liability. (8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already
controlled under this subchapter.”).
52 Diane Hoffmann et al., Will The FDA’s Approval Of Epidiolex Lead to
Rescheduling Marijuana?, H EALTH A FFAIRS: H EALTH A FFAIRS B LOG (July 12, 2018),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180709.904289/full/ [http://perma.cc/94UUZWF6] (“The first petition (1972) took 22 years before a decision was issued; the second (1995)
took six years; and a 2002 petition was not decided until 2011. The most recent petitions (2009
and 2011) were decided in 2016.”).
44
45
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not widely available.”53 Several petitioners have attempted to sue
the DEA to force proceedings to go forward, but the courts have
upheld the DEA’s denials.54
Classifying a drug under Schedule I greatly restricts
potential research that could demonstrate whether a controlled
substance actually has medical use.55 Although Congress
expanded research at the National Institute of Mental Health at
the same time it was passing the CSA,56 the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act gave greater control to the
Justice Department—rather than HHS—to approve research
using Schedule I controlled substances under the rationale of
preventing such drugs from being diverted inappropriately in
clinical trials.57
C.

The Political Push to Revise the CSA Toward Criminalization
Although the CSA had initially been passed with “something
in it for everybody,”58 it increasingly became pulled toward
criminalization and away from public health. In the 1970s, angry
and worried middle-class parents grew fearful of a seemingly
growing acceptance of marijuana use among young people.59
Concerned about the harms of marijuana and its possible
gateway effect to harsher drugs, organized groups of parents
successfully lobbied for tougher criminal sanctions and “zero
tolerance” laws, rather than pushing for harm-reduction
approaches.60 Subsequently, as cocaine, and then crack, became
cheaper and easier to produce, the government increased its law
enforcement efforts, often with bipartisan majorities.61
These fears, however, accompanied prejudices as illicit drug
use was associated with “minority subcultures—musicians, artists,
urban African Americans, Hispanic laborers.”62 Thus, it was not

53 Denial of Petition To Initiate Proceedings To Reschedule Marijuana, 81 Fed. Reg.
53688 (proposed Aug. 12, 2016).
54 Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 438–41 (D.C. Cir. 2012); All. for
Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1131–33 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
55 Grace Wallack & John Hudak, Marijuana Rescheduling: A Partial Prescription for
Policy Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207, 208–12 (2016).
56 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 11.
57 See SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 22–23.
58 Courtwright, supra note 4, at 13.
59 Id. While seemingly concerned about the societal costs of potentially losing a
generation to drug abuse, Nixon also stoked parents’ fears as a political device by arguing,
“It is doubtful that an American parent can send a son or daughter to college today
without exposing the young man or woman to drug abuse.” Id. at 11.
60 Id. at 13.
61 Id.
62 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 260.
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just the fear of “white middle-class youth” engaging in drug use,
but their association with these perceived undesirable, deviant
elements of society.63 While the CSA initially reformed sentencing
guidelines, subsequent legislation reversed this trend.64
II. A TRIO OF NEW REFORMS: POLICY SUCCESSORS TO THE CSA OR
SOMETHING DIFFERENT?
In comparison to the time period that this symposium
focuses on, today’s congressional arena has been characterized by
gridlock65 and deemed a “legislative graveyard.”66 Despite this
hostile environment, CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST STEP all
achieved rare bipartisan support in an increasingly polarized
legislature. This section will provide an overview of each of these
laws, as well as some of the political and legislative machinations
behind the passage of each law.
A. The Legislative Responses to the Opioid Epidemic
Over the last twenty years, Americans’ use of opioids has
increased dramatically: the sales of prescription opioids nearly
quadrupled since 1999 due to several potential causes.67 At the
same time, the death rate due to overdoses tripled to 19.8 per
100,000 individuals, with nearly two-thirds of deaths involving
either prescription or illegal opioids.68 Deaths due to opioid
overdoses exceed automobile accidents in the United States.69 The
opioid epidemic’s toll on the American public’s health is so extensive
that it is linked to a decline in the country’s life expectancy.70 In
addition to the loss of life, the opioid epidemic has had other public
health consequences: nearly two million Americans have a

Id.
Katharine A. Neill, Tough on Drugs: Law and Order Dominance and the Neglect of
Public Health in U.S. Drug Policy, 6 WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y 375, 382–83 (2014).
65 Rainie, supra note 3, at 14.
66 Jordain Carney & Maggie Miller, McConnell under fire for burying election bills in
‘legislative graveyard’, HILL (July 27, 2019, 5:50 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
454967-mcconnell-under-fire-for-burying-election-security-bills-in-legislative-graveyard
[http://perma.cc/S4FD-HUDQ].
67 Claire Felter, The U.S. Opioid Epidemic, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-opioid-epidemic?gclid=Cj0KCQjwjrvpBRC0ARIsAFrFu
V9q18QVmo9U03Pa7jQAz6HUTRZwbFDNRotsevt-y1MMpnTzTGwY6toaAuF_EALw_wcB
[http://perma.cc/D4MH-FSMJ] (last updated Sept. 17, 2019).
68 HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2016
5 (Dec. 2017), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf [http://perma.cc/6JQU-XC7J].
69 Ken Kolosh, Accidental Injury Becomes #3 Cause of Death in the U.S., NAT’L
SAFETY COUNCIL (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.nsc.org/safety-first-blog/accidental-injurybecomes-3-cause-of-death-in-the-us-1 [http://perma.cc/4VVS-QM7F].
70 Felter, supra note 67.
63
64
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prescription opioid use disorder, leading to an increase in illicit
opioid use and diseases, such as Hepatitis C and HIV.71
Many Americans, particularly in rural communities, believed
that a government response was necessary to stem the tide of
opioid misuse.72 By the 2018 midterm elections, sponsoring
legislation aimed at the opioid epidemic was seen as politically
astute.73 Although advocates criticized the legislation because
these bills failed to provide sustainable funding for needed
services,74 politicians viewed introducing legislation as a response
to a pressing societal concern, while being fiscally responsible.75
1. CARA
By 2014, drug overdose deaths had nearly tripled over a
fifteen-year period, and over three out of five of the 47,055 drug
overdose deaths that year involved an opioid.76 Shortly before
the 2014 midterm elections, a small bipartisan group of
Senators—mainly from states seeing the beginning of the
epidemic77—introduced the first version of CARA.78 Subsequently, a
71 Office of the Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Health IT Playbook,
HEALTHIT, http://www.healthit.gov/playbook/full [http://perma.cc/V88V-7VY4] (last updated
Feb. 28, 2018).
72 Danielle Kurtzleben, Poll: Rural Americans Rattled By Opioid Epidemic;
Many Want Government Help, NPR (Oct. 17, 2018, 5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2018/10/17/656515170/poll-rural-americans-rattled-by-opioid-epidemic-many-want-governmenthelp [http://perma.cc/XEV2-SUEE].
73 See Brianna Ehley & Jennifer Haberkorn, Tough reelection? Sponsor an opioid bill,
POLITICO (June 16, 2018, 6:37 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/16/lawmakersopioid-bills-midterms-624926 [http://perma.cc/URD8-XG5H]; see also Katie Zezima & Colby
Itkowitz, Flailing on Fentanyl, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2019/investigations/fentanyl-epidemic-congress/?wpisrc=al_news__alert-politics-alert-national&wpmk=1 [http://perma.cc/X9JK-DWT4] (interviewing the House Republican
sponsor of the bill to increase sentencing minimums for trafficking fentanyl, about his belief
that the bill was not considered because, “[a]s a Republican from a reliably red district who
wasn’t going to face a difficult path to reelection, he didn’t need a legislative success to tout on
the campaign trail.”).
74 Brianna Ehley, Congress’ latest opioid bill won’t solve the crisis, POLITICO (Sept.
17, 2018, 7:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/17/congress-opioids-crisisillegal-drugs-792373 [http://perma.cc/3SQY-R9H2] (“Public health experts and first
responders say the massive bipartisan legislation . . . takes some important steps toward
better access to treatment but lacks the urgency, breadth and steady long-term funding
required to quell the emergency . . . .”).
75 Ehley & Haberkorn, supra note 73 (“Republican supporters of the bills say the
extended time on the floor reflects how seriously the House takes the opioid issue. Most of
the bills sponsored by vulnerable lawmakers are not controversial, in part because they
don't designate new spending.”).
76 Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—United
States, 2010-2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445 (2016).
77 Yongwen Jiang et al., Rhode Island Unintentional Drug Overdose Death Trends
and Ranking—Office of the State Medical Examiners Database, R.I. MED. J. 33, 34 (2018),
http://www.rimed.org/rimedicaljournal/2018/02/2018-02-33-health-jiang.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P4NY-Q8KB].
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bipartisan group of Representatives79 introduced a companion bill.80
Because the bills had been introduced so late in the 113th Congress,
there was little chance either bill would move; however, advocates
responded positively to the legislators’ interest and began to plan for
the next Congress.81
The 2014 elections resulted in giving Republicans control of
both chambers of the 114th Congress, for the first time since the
2006 elections, while President Obama was in his final two years
of office.82 Republicans initially used their new majorities in a
fruitless attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),83 but
subsequently, both parties focused on working collaboratively
around two major initiatives—the opioid epidemic84 and an
investment in medical research85—in an effort to demonstrate
the ability to govern and to produce legislative victories.
Advocates for CARA noted that “the dramatic increase in
opioid-related overdose deaths in virtually every Congressional
district in America” was tragically one of the leading factors that
raised attention to the issue and created a sense of urgency to pass
the bill into law.86 When CARA was signed into law on July 22, 2016,

S. 2839, 113th Cong. § 1 (2014).
Jim Sensenbrenner, Sensenbrenner, Scott, Marino, Bass, Joyce, Ryan Introduce
Comprehensive Legislation to Combat Drug Addiction, JIM SENSENBRENNER (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/2014/12/sensenbrenner-scott-marino-bass-joyce-ryan-introducecomprehensive-legislation-to-combat-drug-addiction [http://perma.cc/YB77-CAA3].
80 H.R. 5845, 113th Cong. § 1 (2014).
81 Sensenbrenner, supra note 79 (noting that the bill had been endorsed by ninety-three
national organizations).
82 Republicans Rule House and Senate for First Time in 8 Years, NBC NEWS (Nov. 4,
2014, 1:38 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/republicans-rule-house-senatefirst-time-8-years-n241126 [http://perma.cc/JW8U-2C96].
83 Russell Berman, ‘Promise Kept’: The Senate Finally Votes to Repeal Obamacare,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/the-senatefinally-votes-to-repeal-obamacare/418644/ [http://perma.cc/CZQ2-DQPH] (noting the
Senate’s party-line, 52-47, in favor of a reconciliation bill that gutted, but did not fully
repeal, the ACA was “purely symbolic” because President Obama vetoed the bill).
84 Paul Demko & Brianna Ehley, Republicans cast opioid bill as their health care
achievement, POLITICO (Sept. 22, 2018, 6:44 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/22/
republicans-defend-opioid-bill-achievement-796837 [http://perma.cc/J3QH-8UEK]. Note
that advocates had urged federal intervention much earlier. Geoff Mumford, Chasing
the dragon: Psychology informs strategies to contain the opioid epidemic, A M.
P SYCHOL. ASS’N (May 2016), http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2016/05/opioidepidemic [http://perma.cc/7A8N-62D3] (While “it would appear from news accounts that
the epidemic reached crisis proportions only recently,” advocates had begun “to raise
the alarm as early as 2006”).
85 Norm Ornstein, A Bipartisan Victory for Medical Research in Congress, ATLANTIC
(July 13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/21st-century-curesact-bipartisan/398369/ [http://perma.cc/M5MD-MK9R].
86 Jeremiah Gardner & Robert Ashford, CARA History & Breakdown, HAZELDEN
BETTY FORD FOUND. (July 11, 2016), http://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/articles/gardner/
cara-history-and-breakdown [http://perma.cc/Z53T-9SUS].
78
79
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advocates hailed it as the “first major federal addiction legislation in
forty years and the most comprehensive effort undertaken to address
the opioid epidemic, encompassing all six pillars necessary for such a
coordinated response—prevention, treatment, recovery, law
enforcement, criminal justice reform, and overdose reversal.”87
Thus, CARA mirrored some of the original promise of the
CSA. First, CARA contained numerous public-health approaches
to combating the opioid epidemic. In addition to a general grant
program for community-based organizations,88 CARA also
increased access points for community-based treatment,89
training for first responders,90 grants targeted at addiction
treatment for pregnant and postpartum women,91 and the types
of health professionals who could prescribe medications to treat
opioid misuse disorders.92 Second, CARA contained several
grants aimed at improving law enforcement responses, including
for state, local, and tribal law enforcement to pursue innovative
approaches to policing,93 and for states to establish prescription
drug monitoring programs.94 Third, CARA reformed processes at
the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) to address how the VA
health system treats pain and prescribes opioids.95
But critics raised concerns about CARA’s approach. First,
critics noted that CARA did not contain actual funding, but
rather provided for authorizations for appropriations.96 Indeed,
including actual funding would have endangered passage in the

87 The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), CADCA, http://www.cadca.org/
comprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act-cara [http://perma.cc/7QL2-BYGW].
88 Id. §§ 103, 601.
89 Id. §§ 107, 110.
90 Id. § 202.
91 Id. §§ 501, 503.
92 Id. § 303.
93 Id. § 201.
94 Id. § 109.
95 Id. Title IX.
96 Bill Heniff, Jr., Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process, CONG. RES.
SERV. (Nov. 26, 2012) (discussing the two-step process for federal spending to carry out a
program, which includes: “(1) enactment of an authorization measure that may create or
continue an agency, program, or activity as well as authorize the subsequent enactment of
appropriations; and (2) enactment of appropriations to provide funds for the authorized
agency, program, or activity.”). CARA authorized a total of $187 million annually in new
appropriations, but there is no guarantee that Congress will allocate that level of funding.
See Jeremiah Gardner & Robert Ashford, CARA History & Breakdown, HAZELDEN BETTY
FORD FOUND. (July 11, 2016), http://www.hazeldenbettyford.org/articles/gardner/carahistory-and-breakdown [http://perma.cc/Z53T-9SUS]; see also Mumford, supra note 84
(“Because funding CARA and passing CARA are separate legislative processes,
skirmishes over how to pay for CARA programs may continue to play out long after the
bill is successfully conferenced and sent to the president for signature.”).
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House.97 Although Democrats decried the lack of actual funding
and unsuccessfully attempted to amend CARA to do so,98 they
ultimately supported the bill.99 Second, there was a question
about equity in regards to how Congress was responding to the opioid
epidemic versus its prior responses to drug abuse. The Centers from
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) found that victims of opioid
overdoses were overwhelmingly white, tended to be male, and
middle-aged.100 Four of the five most affected states—West Virginia,
New Hampshire, Kentucky, and Ohio101—are rural and tended to
lean Republican or be politically competitive.102 Thus, in addition to
the moral and public-health reasons for the response to the epidemic,
there was a political incentive for the majority party to respond to
this drug epidemic differently than prior federal responses.103
2. SUPPORT
A little over two years after CARA’s passage, Congress
revisited the opioid epidemic, passing SUPPORT and sending it to
President Trump for signature.104 Although the opioid epidemic
was still raging, a cynic might question whether a second bill was
needed so quickly or whether SUPPORT was meant to give
Republicans a healthcare achievement prior to the 2018 midterm
elections. Indeed, prior to the passage of SUPPORT, Congressional
97 Burgess Everett & Jennifer Haberkorn, Anti-opioid bill touted by vulnerable
Republicans hits snag, POLITICO (June 30, 2016, 1:03 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/
2016/06/congress-republicans-opioid-bill-224985 [http://perma.cc/7SFP-R6UW] (quoting a
key Senate Republican that the issue over including funding was “more of an issue in the
House than it is in the Senate—from the standpoint of making sure things are paid for
and there isn’t mandatory funding”).
98 Id.
99 Despite Discord Over Funding, Congress Sends Opioid Bill To President’s Desk,
KHN (July 14, 2016), http://khn.org/morning-breakout/despite-discord-over-fundingcongress-sends-opioid-bill-to-presidents-desk/ [http://perma.cc/GS74-FAZK]. In his signing
statement, President Obama also indicated that he was “deeply disappointed that
Republicans failed to provide any real resources for those seeking addiction treatment to
get the care that they need. In fact, they blocked efforts by Democrats to include $920
million in treatment funding.” Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on
the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, WHITE HOUSE (July 22, 2016),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/22/statement-presidentcomprehensive-addiction-and-recovery-act-2016 [http://perma.cc/G8JY-68PE].
100 Rudd, supra note 76, at 1448, 1450 tbls.1 & 2.
101 See id. at 1447 fig.1.
102 See Paul Chisholm, Analysis Finds Geographic Overlap In Opioid Use And Trump
Support In 2016, NPR (June 23, 2018, 8:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/06/23/622692550/analysis-finds-geographic-overlap-in-opioid-use-and-trumpsupport-in-2016 [http://perma.cc/U86H-NGKS].
103 162 CONG. REC. 2372 (2016) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee) (noting that many of
those who turned to crack cocaine were incarcerated rather than offered treatment).
104 See Devin Miller, Opioids bill becomes law; AAP advances key priorities, AAP
NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018), http://www.aappublications.org/news/2018/11/20/washington112018
[http://perma.cc/NL9S-J2G9].
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Republicans attempted to repeal the ACA again with the knowledge
that President Trump would sign any repeal legislation;105 however,
the congressional repeal effort failed again.106
SUPPORT faced some of the same criticisms related to
sustainable funding as CARA did.107 But whereas CARA seemed
to have some logical themes in its legislative structure,108 some
criticized SUPPORT as “scattershot compared with what is
needed.”109 Legislators noted that the process for developing
SUPPORT was “rushed,” as the House considered many different
proposals that were ultimately packaged into a single bill.110
House Energy and Commerce then-Ranking Member, Frank
Pallone, worried that many of the bills that would ultimately
become the foundation of SUPPORT lacked meaningful review:
Due to the rushed timeline, many of these bills are works in progress
and are still in discussion draft form. These forced time constraints
mean that some bills suffer from lack of technical assistance from our
federal agencies or a [fiscal] analysis. Additionally, and equally
important, stakeholders have not had the opportunity to adequately
evaluate these bills or weigh in on their impact.111

Generally, proponents grouped SUPPORT’s provisions into
“four buckets: advancing treatment and recovery initiatives,
improving prevention, protecting our communities, and bolstering
efforts to fight deadly illicit synthetic drugs such as fentanyl.”112

105 Maggie Haberman & Robert Pear, Trump Tells Congress to Repeal and Replace
Health Care Law ‘Very Quickly’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/
01/10/us/repeal-affordable-care-act-donald-trump.html [http://perma.cc/GPY8-4MBG].
106 See Chris Riotta, GOP Aims to Kill Obamacare Yet Again After Failing 70 Times,
NEWSWEEK (July 29, 2017, 6:53 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/gop-health-care-bill-repealand-replace-70-failed-attempts-643832 [http://perma.cc/V43T-BL4C] (noting that Trump
called on Senate Republicans via Twitter to continue to push forward on repeal efforts).
107 Abby Goodnough, In Rare Bipartisan Accord, House and Senate Reach Compromise on
Opioid Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/health/opioid-billcongress.html [http://perma.cc/H9PK-5JLB] (quoting a researcher who stated, “Compared to
how we responded to AIDS, it’s a failure,” but that Congress “didn’t want to spend, so they
agreed on every second-tier issue they could”). During the legislative debate, Ranking Member
Rep. Pallone noted, “The reality is that meaningful policy in this space may cost money, and
agreement on appropriate offsets that do not harm people—including the very people that we
may be trying to help—is a critical component needed in order for me to support these bills
moving forward.” Frank Pallone, Jr., Pallone’s Opening Remarks at Health Subcommittee
Markup of Opioid Legislation, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & COM. (Apr. 25, 2018),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/pallone-s-opening-remarks-athealth-subcommittee-markup-of-opioid [http://perma.cc/XSL8-FUXF].
108 CADCA, supra note 87.
109 Goodnough, supra note 107.
110 Pallone, supra note 107 (Pallone noted that the committee was considering at least
sixty-three bills in “the Chairman’s extremely hasty timeframe to pass opioid legislation”).
111 Id.
112 Greg Walden, Thanks to Congress, we’re making real progress in the opioid crisis,
WASH. EXAMINER (June 22, 2019, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-

Do Not Delete

2020]

5/22/20 8:52 AM

Original Intent

143

3. Funding for the Opioid Response
It is worth discussing further how Congress funded the
legislative response, given that the failure to create sustainable
streams of funding for opioid recovery was a criticism of both
CARA and SUPPORT. While some reforms had little or no fiscal
impact, others would require a substantial investment of funding
in order to be effective.113
As aforementioned, most of CARA and SUPPORT used
authorizations and did not provide mandatory funding. Following
the passage of CARA, Congress included $500 million in grants
to states for both federal fiscal years 2017 and 2018114 to
supplement their efforts to address opioid abuse as part of the
21st Century Cures Act.115 Subsequently, Congress agreed to
provide $6 billion in funding as part of an informal deal to pass a
larger budget compromise.116 These monies, though, would be
allocated through the annual appropriations process.117
Relatedly, both CARA and SUPPORT were passed after
Republicans attempted to repeal the ACA, which in itself plays a

eds/thanks-to-congress-were-making-real-progress-in-the-opioid-crisis [http://perma.cc/T4CEGTCV] (writing, in an editorial, an overview of SUPPORT). But see Zezima & Itkowitz,
supra note 73 (discussing congressional failures to recognize the increasing dangers of the
synthetic opioid fentanyl).
113 Felter, supra note 67.
114 A federal fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30 of the following year.
U.S. SENATE, Glossary Term: Fiscal Year, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal
_year.htm [http://perma.cc/EMW6-TXS4].
115 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). For more on
this law, see Ornstein, supra note 85.
116 See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018) (The
$6 billion commitment—$3 billion for federal fiscal years 2018 and 2019—was a promise
by Senate leadership); see also Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, FIRST FOCUS (Feb. 2018),
http://firstfocus.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/BBA2018-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
[http://perma.cc/LXU8-DU43] (“To ease passage of the BBA, Senate leadership committed
to several funding priorities . . . including . . . $6 billion in additional funding for
combatting the opioid substance abuse epidemic.”).
117 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018)
(shortly after the Bipartisan Budget Act’s passage, the federal fiscal year 2018 was passed into
law). “The FY 2018 appropriations bill allocated more than $4.65 billion across agencies to help
states and local governments in their efforts toward prevention, treatment and law
enforcement initiatives. That represents a $3 billion increase over 2017 spending levels.” For
an accounting of how these monies were allocated in the first year of implementation, see
Holland & Knight, Memorandum: Opioid Crisis Proposals and Funding (Apr. 9, 2018),
http://www.hklaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Alerts/HealthcareLifeandSciences/040918
HealthcareMemoOpioidCrisisProposalsandFunding.pdf [http://perma.cc/B6UG-MW8H]; German
Lopez, Congress’s omnibus bill adds $3.3 billion to fight the opioid crisis. It’s not enough., VOX
(Mar. 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/22/17150294/
congress-omnibus-bill-opioid-epidemic [http://perma.cc/CDU8-4XAJ]; Tracking Federal
Funding to Combat the Opioid Crisis, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 2019),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Tracking-Federal-Funding-to-Combatthe-Opioid-Crisis.pdf [http://perma.cc/6JLZ-BLFK].

Do Not Delete

144

5/22/20 8:52 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 23:1

major role in providing financial support and coverage for
treating opioid misuse and other addictions.118 These pivots
suggest moving away from a fight that had grown unpopular
with the broader electorate,119 but also an attempt to push
forward reforms on the cheap.120 Had the ACA been repealed and
replaced in its entirety, it would have created havoc for many
initiatives attempting to fight the opioid epidemic and provide
treatment to those suffering from opioid addiction.121 Several
wavering Senators requested that additional funding, specifically
for addressing the opioid epidemic, would be included in a repeal
proposal, but ACA supporters argued such funds would not be

118 Kendal Orgera & Jennifer Tolbert, The Opioid Epidemic and Medicaid’s Role in
Facilitating Access to Treatment, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 24, 2019),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-opioid-epidemic-and-medicaids-role-in-facilitatingaccess-to-treatment [http://perma.cc/6PZA-48RL] (Of the “nearly two million nonelderly adults in
the United States [who] had an opioid use disorder (OUD) . . . nearly four in ten were covered by
Medicaid”). Note that some conservatives believe that the ACA and its Medicaid expansion helped
cause the opioid epidemic. See Majority Staff Report of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t
Affairs, Drugs for Dollars: How Medicaid Helps Fuel the Opioid Epidemic, Executive Summary 2
(2018), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-01-17%20Drugs%20for%20Dollars%20
How%20Medicaid%20Helps%20Fuel%20the%20Opioid%20Epidemic.pdf [http://perma.cc/TY7ZMBUL]; see also Nicholas Eberstadt, Our Miserable 21st Century, COMMENTARY (Feb. 2017),
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/our-miserable-21st-century [http://perma.cc/DJ25XQSH] (declaring it “incontrovertible” that “Medicaid inadvertently helped finance America’s
immense and increasing appetite for opioids in our new century”). Others, however, argue that
there is little data to support such a conclusion:
First, trends in opioid deaths nationally and by Medicaid expansion status
predate the ACA. Second, counties with the largest coverage gains actually
experienced smaller increases in drug-related mortality than counties with
smaller coverage gains. Third, the fact that Medicaid recipients fill more opioid
prescriptions than non-recipients largely reflects greater levels of disability
and chronic illness in the populations that Medicaid serves.
Andrew Goodman-Bacon & Emma Sandoe, Did Medicaid Expansion Cause The Opioid
Epidemic? There’s Little Evidence That It Did., HEALTH AFF. (Aug. 23, 2017),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170823.061640/full/
[http://perma.cc/4FCZ-S6GM].
119 Ashley Kirzinger et al., KAISER FAM. FOUND., 6 Charts About Public Opinion On The
Affordable Care Act, RAMAON HEALTHCARE (July 19, 2019), http://ramaonhealthcare.com/6charts-about-public-opinion-on-the-affordable-care-act/ [http://perma.cc/5KFN-8BTB] (“During
Republican efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA) during the summer of 2017, KFF
Health Tracking Polls began to find a slight uptick in overall favorability towards the 2010
health care law.”).
120 Goodnough, supra note 107.
121 Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Trump administration undermines
anti-opioid efforts by opposing Obamacare, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2019),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2019/03/28/the-health202-trump-administration-undermines-anti-opioid-efforts-by-opposing-obamacare/5c9ba06f1b3
26b0f7f38f28a/?noredirect=on [http://perma.cc/2H7G-2CZK] (noting that a repeal of the ACA
would “endanger the [federal government]’s anti-opioids effort by leaving around 25 million
Americans without health coverage and removing the law’s requirements for insurers to cover
substance abuse services as part of 10 essential health benefits”).
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sufficient to make up for a repeal of the ACA.122 The major repeal
proposals would have restructured Medicaid,123 and many
opponents of this effort argued that it would have resulted in a
cut to safety-net, public-funded behavioral health programs and
other state initiatives.124 The Medicaid program, which provides
federal matching dollars for state health services for low-income
adults, provides the financial foundation for many substance
misuse disorder programs.125 Additionally, opponents of the
repeal noted that eliminating the ACA would strike its
requirement that substance abuse treatment be considered an
essential benefit, as well as protect consumers from being
discriminated against for having a pre-existing condition, such as
a substance misuse disorder.126
B. Criminal Justice Reform: FIRST STEP
In recent years, pundits have highlighted shifts in how some
policymakers—particularly conservative ones—have approached
criminal-justice issues and how the electorate has responded.127
At the federal level, a meaningful attempt to address some of the
punitive measures from the amended CSA took shape in 2015

122 Dylan Scott, More opioid funding won’t save the Senate health care bill, V OX
(June 29, 2017, 5:20 PM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/29/15895906/
voxcare-bcra-opioid-funding-capito [http://perma.cc/T2R7-27HB] (noting that one key
Senator requested $45 billion in specific funding for the opioid epidemic).
123 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMPARISON OF THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ACT
(AHCA) AND THE BETTER CARE RECONCILIATION ACT (BCRA), 11–22 (2017),
http://crsreportscongress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44883 [http://perma.cc/C9AT-RRM6].
124 Marianna Sotomayor, Trump signs sweeping opioid bill with vote to end ‘scourge’
of drug addiction, NBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2018, 1:51 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/congress/trump-signs-sweeping-opioid-bill-vow-end-scourge-drug-addiction-n923976
[http://perma.cc/L9UF-AWFY] (quoting Pallone regarding SUPPORT, that it would be
“disingenuous at best to promise relief to people struggling with opioid addiction while also
attempting to cut funding for Medicaid and eliminate protections for people with pre-existing
conditions, which include opioid use disorder”).
125 Orgera & Tolbert, supra note 118.
126 Reed Abelson et al., What Happens if Obamacare Is Struck Down?, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/health/obamacare-trump-health.html
[http://perma.cc/A2K6-US4N].
127 Timothy Williams & Thomas Kaplan, The Criminal Justice Debate Has Changed
Drastically. Here’s Why., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/us/
politics/criminal-justice-reform-sanders-warren.html [http://perma.cc/N56G-Q7MD] (discussing
how previously “radical” ideas were being debated as part of the Democratic presidential
nomination campaign due to “a seismic shift in how the American public views criminal justice
issues,” but likely to be “used by President Trump and his allies to tar whoever becomes the
Democratic nominee”). Additionally, several reforms have occurred at the state level, such as
restoring voting rights in purple states, like Virginia and Florida. See id. (discussing a
California initiative limiting the use of deadly force); see also Victoria Shineman, Florida
restores voting rights to 1.5 million citizens, which might also decrease crime, CONVERSATION
(Nov. 7, 2018, 2:05 AM), http://theconversation.com/florida-restores-voting-rights-to-1-5million-citizens-which-might-also-decrease-crime-106528 [http://perma.cc/NK4R-P5BX].
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when a key Republican, the Senate Judiciary Chairman Chuck
Grassley, agreed to introduce bipartisan legislation to reform
federal sentencing laws.128 But there was skepticism whether
reform efforts would continue after the 2016 election ushered in
the Trump Administration and a more conservative Congress.129
Although polling found general public support for reforming
federal sentencing laws for drug convictions,130 the issue did not
seem to have the same overt public outcry from the general
public as addressing the opioid epidemic.131
An unusual coalition of disparate interests were able to
maintain momentum for criminal justice reforms in the next
Congress.132 These key discrete constituencies in the unusual
political coalition provided the political cover necessary to
overcome the “law and order” resistance against the modest

128 See Antonio Ginatta, Dispatches: Strange Bedfellows for US Criminal Justice
Reform, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 1, 2015, 5:09 PM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/01/
dispatches-strange-bedfellows-us-criminal-justice-reform [http://perma.cc/YM94-AR8L].
129 See Miriam S. Gohara, Keep on Keeping On: Maintaining Momentum for Criminal
Justice Reform During the Trump Era, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 1 (2018), http://law.stanford.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Gohara-05.28.18.pdf [http://perma.cc/N98T-RXZM]; see
also Bill Keller, How Criminal Justice Reform Died, V ICE (Sept. 28, 2016, 9:00 PM),
http://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yvewn7/how-criminal-justice-reform-died-bill-keller
[http://perma.cc/DVL4-CATT] (discussing political campaigning during the 2016 election
cycle and partisan concerns about giving the outgoing Obama Administration a victory);
see also Carl Hulse, Why the Senate Couldn’t Pass a Crime Bill Both Parties Backed, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/senate-dysfunctionblocks-bipartisan-criminal-justice-overhaul.html [http://perma.cc/MF72-JZJ2] (quoting a
Republican Senator that the Republican leadership did not want the caucus to seem
divided on a key issue, as well as noting that then-Republican presidential nominee
Trump was campaigning on a “tough-on-crime” message).
130 See Poll Shows Americans Overwhelmingly Support Prison, Sentencing Reforms,
COMM. ON JUD. (Aug. 23, 2018), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/poll-showsamericans-overwhelmingly-support-prison-sentencing-reforms [http://perma.cc/DKC5-UG8C];
see also 91 Percent of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU Polling Finds,
ACLU (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.aclu.org/press-releases/91-percent-americans-supportcriminal-justice-reform-aclu-polling-finds [http://perma.cc/GT7R-87DR].
131 See John Gramlich, Voters’ perception of crime continue to conflict with reality,
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/16/votersperceptions-of-crime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality [http://perma.cc/AXG3-J4AB] (“Almost
eight-in-ten voters who supported President-elect Donald Trump (78%) said this, as did
37% of backers of Democrat Hillary Clinton” and believed that crime worsened between
2008 and 2016, although “U.S. violent crime and property crime rates fell 19% and 23%,
respectively,” from 2008 to 2015); see also Little Partisan Agreement on the Pressing Problems
Facing the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2018), http://www.people-press.org/2018/10/15/littlepartisan-agreement-on-the-pressing-problems-facing-the-u-s [http://perma.cc/LX2A-GW9A]
(noting that while Democrats and Republicans shared similar views on whether “violent crime
(49% of Republicans, 47% of Democrats) and drug addiction (67% of Republicans, 64% of
Democrats)” were priority issues before the 2018 elections, “71% of Democratic voters say the
way racial and ethnic minorities are treated by the criminal justice system is a very big
problem for the country, compared with just 10% of Republican voters.”).
132 Ray Suarez, Trump’s Push For Prison Reform, ON POINT (May 21, 2018),
http://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2018/05/21/trump-prison-reform [http://perma.cc/HW4H-3PSQ].

Do Not Delete

2020]

5/22/20 8:52 AM

Original Intent

147

reforms in FIRST STEP.133 For instance, although President
Trump campaigned134—and continues to campaign135—on a
hardline message regarding “law and order,” and selected a
conservative Attorney General known to oppose marijuana
legalization and other reforms,136 his embrace of FIRST STEP
helped overcome some Senate Republicans’ reservations of
supporting it.137

133 Osita Nwanevu, The Improbable Success of a Criminal-Justice-Reform Bill Under
Trump, NEW YORKER (Dec. 17, 2018), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/theimprobable-success-of-a-criminal-justice-reform-bill-under-trump [http://perma.cc/8LHN-KMEX]
(“The significant buy-in from the right is the culmination of years of effort from a cadre of
libertarian-leaning conservatives, like the anti-tax zealot Grover Norquist, and
evangelicals, such as Chuck Colson, the founder of the Christian nonprofit organization
Prison Fellowship, who have worked to convince others that the prison system has
become too costly, punitive, and government-empowering.”). See also Arthur Rizer & Lars
Trautman, The conservative case for criminal justice reform, GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2018, 6:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/05/the-conservative-case-for-criminal-justicereform [http://perma.cc/SL6L-7AFW] (arguing why “conservatives must go back to the
principles of liberty and dignity that first defined their party,” and apply “these principles
to criminal justice reform”). Key influential conservatives were moved by the massive
costs for maintaining a vast prison system with seemingly little effect on crime rates,
SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 279 (noting “the high social costs of mass
incarceration”), as well as an increasing policy presence—particularly by the federal
government—that threatened individual liberties. See Criminal Justice Reform,
CHARLES KOCH INST., http://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justicepolicing-reform/ [http://perma.cc/493E-ECQU]. But see Keller, supra note 129 (arguing
that the “spectacular mustering of bipartisan solidarity at a time of political
polarization and paralysis . . . was not nearly as muscular as it seemed”).
134 Hulse, supra note 129 (noting that Trump’s 2016 campaign included “warnings of
a United States at risk from sinister forces, even though violent crime is low compared
with past decades”).
135 Christina Wilkie, Trump praises ‘stop and frisk,’ calls for tougher policing tactics,
CNBC (Oct. 8, 2018, 4:06 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/08/trump-praises-stop-and-friskcalls-for-tougher-policing-tactics.html [http://perma.cc/7J96-DYTW]. In relation to the opioid
epidemic, Trump seemingly called for the death penalty for drug trafficking. See Ayesha
Rascoe, How Trump Went From Tough on Crime’ To Second Chance’ For Felons, NPR,
MORNING EDITION (Dec. 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/12/17/676771335/howtrump-went-from-tough-on-crime-to-second-chance-for-felons [http://perma.cc/T82Z-HRK5]
(quoting President Trump as suggesting “at some point, we'll get very smart as a nation and
give them the ultimate punishment”).
136 Jordan Waldrep, What Replacing Jeff Sessions As AG Means For Marijuana
Legalization, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2018, 8:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanwaldrep/
2018/11/13/what-replacing-jeff-sessions-as-ag-means-for-marijuana-legalization/#1a138ae0103f
[http://perma.cc/2DAG-7J2K]. Most notably, during his tenure, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
reversed the so-called Cole memo, which was guidance issued under the Obama Administration
that permitted U.S. Attorneys to focus resources away from marijuana prosecutions in states
where its use was permitted. See THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
137 Gohara, supra note 129. Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, whose father had served
time in federal prison, is often credited for pushing Trump to support FIRST STEP. Rascoe, supra
note 135. Trump’s embrace of FIRST STEP has led subsequently to strange confrontations over
credit for its passage. See Jacey Fortin, Trump Insults Chrissy Teigen and John Legend, and They
Fire Back, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/us/chrissy-teigentrump-twitter.html [http://perma.cc/N239-Q6RZ].
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Despite this confluence of support, the legislative debate
over FIRST STEP was quite divisive and reflective of different
positions within conservative philosophy.138 Passed shortly after
SUPPORT and in the “lame duck” session following the midterm
elections,139 FIRST STEP represented a series of compromises,
again paralleling some of the compromises between the Nixon
Administration and the Democratic Congress over the CSA.140
One of the bill’s Senate Republican sponsors even suggested
revising the bill’s sentencing reforms to make it more palatable
to opposing Senators.141 Such revisions included a new
mechanism for allowing early release, a look at who would be
eligible to participate in early release,142 and what penalties were
appropriate for drug offenses.143 Senator Tom Cotton, a
Republican from Arkansas and the lead opponent of FIRST
STEP, argued that the bill’s proponents were incorrect in their
public statements as to how the bill would actually work.144 In a
series of opinion pieces outlining his opposition,145 Cotton argued
that the bill would allow a larger segment of felons than the
proponents described to be able to seek early release.146 Cotton
138 Everett & Haberkorn, supra note 97. Given the limited window for debate on the
Senate floor, Senate leaders are generally reluctant to bring up bills that divide their
caucus and could delay other competing legislative priorities. Burgess Everett & Elana
Schor, Cotton wields sex offender report to tank prisons bill, POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:26
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/26/tom-cotton-criminal-justice-reform-senaterepublicans-trump-1015149 [http://perma.cc/HE92-RLEV]. Further, in this particular
situation, it was likely that the Senate would pass a bill different than what the House
had passed earlier in the legislative session, and because a number of House Republicans
were retiring or had been defeated in the 2018 election, it could be difficult to convince the
House to remain in session to take up a new bill. Id.
139 Burgess Everett & Elana Schor, Criminal justice reform bill still alive as McConnell
deliberates, POLITICO (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:12 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/29/congresscriminal-justice-reform-senate-mcconnell-1032469 [http://perma.cc/XYU9-7QC3].
140 See supra notes 21–57.
141 Elana Schor, Criminal justice deal faces steep Senate hurdles despite Trump’s push,
POLITICO (Aug. 17, 2018, 5:08 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/17/senate-criminaljustice-deal-trump-781876 [http://perma.cc/2N8F-KCWS] (quoting Senator John Cornyn, “The
sentencing reform stuff begins to divide people, including the administration.”).
142 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 101, 132 Stat. 5193, 5196–98 (2018)
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3632).
143 Id. at 5220–21.
144 Tom Cotton, What’s Really in Congress’s Justice-Reform Bill, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 26,
2018, 10:48 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/first-step-criminal-justice-reformbill-whats-in-it/ [http://perma.cc/VHV7-RWVP].
145 See id.; see also Tom Cotton, Lame-duck Congress’ rush for criminal justice reform
plan will hurt, not help, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2018, 9:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2018/11/15/tom-cotton-congresss-criminal-justice-reform-bill-opioids-lawscolumn/2003829002/ [http://perma.cc/C4LY-2B26].
146 Cotton, supra note 144. For a response to Cotton’s argument that many early-released
prisoners will commit felonies subsequently, see Zak Cheney-Rice, Tom Cotton’s America Is Not a
Free America, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Dec. 13, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/tomscotton-first-step-act.html [http://perma.cc/C3YF-3RWF] (noting that Cotton’s arguments do not
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also attacked granting federal judges more discretion to ignore
mandatory minimum sentences for those with prior criminal
records.147 Lastly, Cotton invoked the opioid epidemic at least
twice: he noted that “[m]ore than 90 percent of traffickers [of
heroin and fentanyl] will be eligible for the time credits” toward
an early release, and he argued that the bill would result in a
repeat fentanyl trafficker potentially serving half of the prison
sentence than would be required under current law.148
In response, Senator Mike Lee, a Republican from Utah,
defended FIRST STEP in a parallel editorial.149 Lee noted that
certain federal inmates could seek “pre-release custody—meaning
home confinement, supervised release, or a halfway house.”150 Lee
reiterated that the bill explicitly would exclude certain categories
of offenders, and only allows inmates to seek the new credits
created by FIRST STEP if they are at a minimum or low risk of
recidivism.151 Whereas Cotton argued that this determination of
recidivism was too reliant on “government bureaucrats” and
could be gamed by a future administration,152 Lee responded that the
determinations would be made by “experienced law-enforcement
officers.”153 Lee also noted that FIRST STEP only granted discretion
for federal judges to ignore mandatory minimums in limited
circumstances; for instance, such discretion would not be available in
cases where defendants “used or threatened violence or possessed a

distinguish between those in federal versus state prison, and thus incorrectly account for those
“locked up for drug offenses” and recidivism rates).
147 Cotton, supra note 144.
148 Id.; see also Zezima & Itkowitz, supra note 73 (discussing how Senate leadership
decided not to bring up a bill for consideration that would increase the sentence for
fentanyl trafficking because of concerns that it “would clash with the effort and possibly
imperil the bill’s [FIRST STEP’s] passage”).
149 Mike Lee, The Truth about the FIRST STEP Act, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:05
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/the-truth-about-the-first-step-act/
[http://perma.cc/VS48-EW6C].
150 Id.
151 Id. Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee disputed Cotton’s arguments
related to FIRST STEP’s treatment of sex offenders. See Everett & Schor, supra note 138
(referring to a committee spokesperson who distinguished between credits for good behavior
under current law and changes made by FIRST STEP); see also Summary of the Revised
First Step Act, infra note 156 (“Original text of the bill already excluded sex offenders.”).
152 Cotton, supra note 144 (“But this requires extraordinary faith in the government’s
ability to predict the recidivism risk of violent felons. . . . But it is surprising to me that
conservatives, and especially libertarians, have faith that government bureaucrats can
judge the state of a felon’s soul and predict his future behavior. Even if you trusted the
current administration to do so, would you trust a future Democratic administration?”).
153 Lee, supra note 149; see also Salvador Rizzo, Does the sentencing bill give early release to
drug traffickers, sex offenders?, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2018/11/30/does-sentencing-bill-give-early-release-drug-traffickers-sex-offenders/
[http://perma.cc/2E3D-2U8F] (discussing the “objective criteria and a point system to assess risk”
used by the Bureau of Prisons).
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firearm or other dangerous weapon, or if their offense resulted in
serious bodily injury or death.”154 Finally, Lee disputed Cotton’s
determination of the time a fentanyl dealer would serve and the
amount of qualifying activities such felons could participate in to
reduce their sentences.155
In the end though, the Senate adopted an amendment to
FIRST STEP that addressed several of Cotton’s and other
opponents’ arguments.156 Although Cotton and his allies voted
against FIRST STEP, it overwhelmingly passed the Senate157 and
then was agreed to by the House.158
III. MARIJUANA IN THE SHADOW OF THE CSA
As Congress has debated responses to the opioid epidemic
and whether to reform federal sentencing for drug offenses, there
has been a related debate has been over the treatment of
marijuana. Legalization of marijuana is seemingly popular with
the electorate, and some policymakers have called for its
legalization for medical purposes, and sometimes even
recreational use, as well as forgiveness for prior drug offenses
related to marijuana. Yet, even while change is happening
rapidly at the state level, marijuana remains criminalized by the
fifty-year-old CSA. This section will explore the movement at the
state level toward legalization of marijuana, the failure to amend
the CSA, and the conflict between state and federal law.
A. State Activity on Marijuana
As discussed previously, the federal government often plays
a leadership role in influencing and standardizing states’
criminal laws.159 For instance, when the CSA became law, the
Nixon Administration promoted a Uniform Controlled Substances

Lee, supra note 149.
Id.
See CONG. REC. (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2018) (Sen. McConnell proposing an
amendment to S. 756); see also Summary of the Revised First Step Act, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Revised%20First%20Step%20Act%20-%20Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/EV3W-9CTA]. In
order to move quickly through the legislative process, the Senate amended an unrelated bill
that had already passed the House with the modified version of FIRST STEP. In response, the
House voted on a motion to concur with this Senate amendment, allowing the bill to move to
the President for signature. Summary: S. 756 (115th): S. 756: FIRST Step Act, GOVTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s756/summary [http://perma.cc/B4DP-NT6N] (last
updated Dec. 18, 2018).
157 U.S. S. ROLL CALL VOTE 271, 115th Cong., 2nd Session (passing 87 to 12).
158 U.S. HOUSE ROLL CALL VOTE 448, 115th Cong., 2nd Session (passing 358 to 36).
159 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 234–35.
154
155
156
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Act that eventually was adopted by the states.160 Although several
politicians in the 1960s adopted a tough-on-crime message to
capitalize on a general concern about disorder,161 a public health
approach to drug addiction also emerged as a competing policy
option to criminalization.162 Additionally, increasing use of
marijuana created some public skepticism about criminalizing
drugs.163 Thus, as aforementioned, advocates for each of these
different policy options were able to find compromise in the initial
CSA, but subsequently, policymakers amended the CSA and made
other policy decisions that favored criminalization and interdiction
over a public health approach to drug issues.164
Advocates for reform, particularly for marijuana reform,
looked for other avenues, such as popular referendums, as a
means of bypassing resistant legislative majorities.165 The first
success was in California: after several legislative failures,
advocates petitioned for a referendum on legalizing marijuana for
medical purposes.166 Advocates focused on the belief that
marijuana could provide relief for those with terminal illnesses
such as HIV and cancer.167 Ultimately, in 1996, the referendum,
Proposition 215, successfully passed 55% to 44%, making
California the first state to legalize medical marijuana.168
Subsequently, thirty-two more states and the District of Columbia
have legalized medical marijuana, either through ballot initiatives
or by traditional legislation.169
Building on these successes, advocates have turned toward
legalizing marijuana for recreational or “adult” use, and time
will tell if this movement is as successful as efforts to allow for

160 See id. (“Today, every U.S. state has passed this legislation [the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act], ensuring that the federal government sets the terms of drug control.”).
161 Id. at 254–56.
162 Id. at 235 (discussing the “emerging influence of the mental health profession [as]
an alternative approach to the problem of narcotics”); Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 157
(discussing how “mental health professionals responsible for treating addicts gained a
voice in policy debates”).
163 SPILLANE & WOLCOTT, supra note 24, at 235 (“[W]idespread use of marijuana and
narcotics created a reality that undermined [federal officials’] horror stories about
them.”); Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 157.
164 It remains to be seen whether CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST STEP, supra Part III,
signify a divergence from this course or a temporary aberration.
165 Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 163.
166 Id. at 163–65.
167 Id. at 167–68.
168 Proposition 215, printed in Cal. Sec’y State, California Ballot Pamphlet: General
Election November 5, 1996, at 58 (1996).
169 State Medical Marijuana Laws, NCSL (Sept. 27, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/9CBM-CEPH].
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medical marijuana. In 2012, voters in Colorado170 and
Washington171 passed ballot initiatives, making the two states
the first to legalize marijuana for adult-use purposes.
Subsequently, Alaska,172 California,173 Illinois,174 Maine,175
Massachusetts,176 Michigan,177 Nevada,178 Oregon,179 and
Vermont,180 adopted adult-use policies, often with the
expectation of raising state revenues while hoping to reduce
enforcement efforts.
In addition to the divergence between medical and recreational
use of marijuana, the approach used in each state toward
legalization—particularly for recreational use—has varied as well.181

170 COLO. CONST. amend. 64. A prior amendment, that would have decriminalized
marijuana in 2006, had failed. Colorado Votes In Favor Of Pot Legalization, CBSDENVER
(Nov. 6, 2012, 11:56 PM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2012/11/06/no-on-64-concedes-coloradovotes-in-favor-of-pot-legalization/ [http://perma.cc/C3LH-FWN3].
171 Initiative Measure 502 (Wash. 2012).
172 A Summary of Measure 2, An Act to Tax and Regulate the use of Marijuana,
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/alaska/a-summary-of-measure-2-anact-to-tax-and-regulate-the-production-sale-and-use-of-marijuana/ [http://perma.cc/RJ7W-RDUP]
(discussing successful 2014 ballot measure).
173 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550.5(a)(3) (West 2019) (explaining that AUMA, under the
initiative Prop. 215, was enacted into the state legislature).
174 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705 (West 2019). Illinois is the first state to approve
legal sales through the state legislature rather than a ballot measure.
175 As retail stores open across the state, regulators consider delivery, social consumption
rules, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 12, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/maine/
[http://perma.cc/3W5U-S7HE] (discussing successful 2016 ballot measure and the delays
in implementation).
176 Historic victory: The 2016 Yes on 4 Campaign, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 12,
2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/massachusetts/ [http://perma.cc/69SH-HNA6] (discussing
successful 2012 ballot measure).
177 Marijuana Regulatory Agency publishes emergency rules to implement legalization,
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (July 22, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/michigan/
[http://perma.cc/NFE-QCBF] (discussing successful 2018 ballot measure).
178 States increasingly looking to Nevada as a model, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Nov. 5,
2018), http://www.mpp.org/states/nevada/ [http://perma.cc/VY55-38YQ] (discussing successful
2016 ballot measure).
179 The Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Act: A
Summary of Measure 91, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/oregon/
summary-of-oregons-measure-91/ [http://perma.cc/R9FH-2AMD] (discussing successful
2014 ballot measure).
180 Vermont became the first state to decriminalize, by legislation, the adult-use of
marijuana by decriminalizing possession and limited cultivation of cannabis by adults
twenty-one and older. See Vermonters enjoy legal home-grown cannabis; bill to regulate
retail sales passes Senate—House to take up bill in early 2020, MARIJUANA POL’Y
PROJECT (May 28, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/states/vermont/ [http://perma.cc/4MUY-9YSW].
However, this state law did not set up a regulatory system for sales or production. Wilson
Ring, Vermont, New Hampshire Both Could Delay Marijuana Proposals, CBS BOSTON
(May 18, 2019, 2:35 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2019/05/18/vermont-new-hampshirecould-delay-recreational-marijuana-proposals/ [http://perma.cc/9J78-GSB2].
181 Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 149 (“The growing willingness of policy entrepreneurs
to invoke the initiative process may heighten political conflict between federal and state
institutions and actors with divergent policy priorities.”).
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Despite the apparent popularity of marijuana legalization,182 most
states’ legalization process came through ballot initiatives, not
through legislation.183 This difference is even starker in efforts
around recreational marijuana. Of the states that have legalized
recreational use, only Illinois184 and Vermont185 have done so via
the legislative process, with high-profile legislative failures in the
politically liberal states of Connecticut,186 New Jersey,187 New
Mexico,188 and New York.189 While some opposition focused on
oft-cited concerns about criminal activity, other political concerns
included the impact on low-income communities and whether these
communities would see the economic benefits of legalization.190

Hartig & Geiger, supra note 13.
A referendum, however, failed in North Dakota that would have legalized
marijuana for adult use and expunged prior offenses automatically. North Dakota
Measure 3, Marijuana Legalization and Automatic Expungement Initiative (2018),
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Measure_3,_Marijuana_Legalization_
and_Automatic_Expungement_Initiative_(2018) [http://perma.cc/DY6Q-YXX2].
184 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705 (West 2019).
185 Ring, supra note 180 (discussing how Vermont had decriminalized recreational
use of marijuana, but had not yet passed a scheme for regulating such use).
186 Ryan Holz, Connecticut Joins Other Northeast States in Failing to Pass Recreational
Marijuana Legislation in 2019, JD SUPRA (June 14, 2019), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
connecticut-joins-other-northeast-97789/ [http://perma.cc/QDY8-PTMD].
187 Ryan Hutchins et al., Legal pot bill dead: New Jersey lawmakers to move ahead
with 2020 referendum, POLITICO (May 15, 2019, 11:57 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/
new-jersey/story/2019/05/15/marijuana-bill-dead-new-jersey-lawmakers-to-move-forward-withreferendum-1017330 [http://perma.cc/5FCC-CLZ4].
188 N.M. MUT., Recreational marijuana use in New Mexico could pass in 2020. Will your
business be ready?, ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (June 1, 2019), http://www.bizjournals.com/
albuquerque/news/2019/06/01/recreational-marijuana-use-in-new-mexico-could.html
[http://perma.cc/Z675-NSWT].
189 Joseph Spector & Jon Campbell, Why legalizing marijuana in New York
failed, but decriminalizing it passed, D EMOCRAT & C HRON. (June 21, 2019, 8:20 AM),
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2019/06/21/why-legalizingpot-new-york-failed-but-decriminalizing-passed/1521505001/ [http://perma.cc/5Z6T-TUGE].
190 Vivian Wang, Final Push to Legalize Pot Fails in New York, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019),
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/nyregion/marijuana-legalization-ny.html?module=inline
[http://perma.cc/6GWS-L8QK] (finding that suburban state senators might not have
voted for the bill); Nick Corasaniti, Effort to Legalize Marijuana in New Jersey
Collapses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/nyregion/newjersey-marijuana.html [http://perma.cc/Z2TL-K38D] (noting that lawmakers were concerned
about the public health impact on minority communities and “challenges faced by other
states that have legalized cannabis, including how to keep the drug away from
teenagers and prevent people from driving under its influence”); Vivian Wang & Jeffery
C. Mays, Black Lawmakers to Block Legalized Marijuana in N.Y. if Their Communities
Don’t Benefit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/
nyregion/marijuana-legalization-african-americans.html?action=click&module=Related
Links&pgtype=Article [http://perma.cc/B6MZ-CKQD] (noting that black legislators in New
York would withhold support for an adult-use legislation bill unless they were “assured that
some of that money will go toward job training programs, and that minority entrepreneurs will
receive licenses to cultivate or sell the marijuana”).
182
183
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B. Recent Federal Activity on Marijuana to Amend the CSA
In contrast to tremendous state activity following the
California ballot initiative, little has changed in regard to
marijuana at the federal level since the CSA passed some fifty
years ago.191 The following subsection will provide a brief
overview of federal actions, with a particular focus on federal
enforcement of the CSA.
Although several high-profile members of Congress have
introduced legislation on marijuana,192 there has been little
movement on these proposals in either the Democratic-controlled
House or Republican-controlled Senate.193 The issue gaining
attention in the 116th Congress is providing a “safe harbor” for
financial institutions to do business with state-licensed
marijuana companies and related providers.194 The House passed
the Secure And Fair Enforcement (“SAFE”) Banking Act,195 while
the Senate Banking Committee is considering marking up the
same or similar legislation.196 Some advocates, however, have
191 When a majority of states adopt a similar position—even if that position is in contrast
to federal law—it can provide political cover for federal policymakers to amend federal law to
be consistent with the states. Kim, supra note 16, at 94 (noting how state right-to-try laws
helped usher a change to federal regulations around access to experimental drugs).
192 Justin Strekal, 4/20: Will Congress advance marijuana legislation in 2019? HILL
(Apr. 20, 2019, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/439806-4-20-will-congressadvance-marijuana-legislation-in-2019 [http://perma.cc/9HWV-KZVF] (“As of this writing,
members of Congress have introduced five separate bills to end the federal prohibition of
marijuana. In addition, there are also more than half a dozen bills pending before Congress
that seek to restrain the federal enforcement of cannabis prohibition in states that have
reformed their marijuana laws.”).
193 See, e.g., Caitlyn Kim, After Years of Stalemate, Federal Cannabis Legislation Finds
Traction in Congress, CPR (July 22, 2019), http://www.cpr.org/2019/07/22/after-years-ofstalemate-federal-cannabis-legislation-finds-traction-in-congress/ [http://perma.cc/EY8CCPW5]. The Marijuana Policy Project lists a dozen bills—with several having bipartisan
support—in the current 116th Congress. See Several marijuana-related bills filed in new
Congress, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Sept. 25, 2019), http://www.mpp.org/policy/federal/
[http://perma.cc/5PR4-DUXJ].
194 Sam Kamin, Legal Cannabis in the U.S.: Not Whether but How?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 617, 620 (2016) (“In addition, anyone conspiring with or aiding and abetting those
violating federal law are equally liable for a violation of federal law. This includes, at least
in principle, anyone leasing space to marijuana businesses, working for or contracting
with them, or providing basic services such as accounting, banking, financial, and legal
services.”) (footnotes omitted).
195 H.R. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019) (passing the House by a vote of 321 to 103).
196 Zachary Warmbrodt, Crapo plans landmark cannabis banking vote, POLITICO
(Sept. 13, 2019, 5:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/13/crapo-cannabisbanking-vote-1729925 [http://perma.cc/5GHD-J7NM] (noting the committee chairman’s
interest “because of questions surrounding transactions with other businesses, like
plumbers and hardware stores, that provide services to the marijuana industry”). Notably,
Senator Mike Crapo of Idaho, the Banking Committee Chairman, represents a state that
does not allow for either medical or recreational marijuana. 2020 medical marijuana ballot
petition approved for circulation, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Aug. 15, 2019),
http://www.mpp.org/states/idaho/ [http://perma.cc/8KMU-8G2T].
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raised concerns about addressing the financial issues of the
marijuana industry without also addressing some of the systemic
issues caused by the federal criminalization of marijuana.197
Congress has also intervened in the federal enforcement of
the CSA. Given the supremacy of federal law, the Supreme Court
has held that state legalization does not prohibit federal
enforcement of the CSA, even on wholly intrastate activities,
such as a patient growing a small amount of marijuana for
personal consumption.198 After receiving criticism on its policy on
marijuana prosecutions,199 the Obama Administration issued
guidance in 2013 to federal prosecutors to exercise their
discretion whether to prosecute marijuana cases in states with a
robust regulatory system for legalized uses of marijuana.200
Subsequently in 2014, Congress included an amendment in an
appropriations bill that prohibited the Justice Department from
prosecuting those involved in state medical marijuana
initiatives.201 So far, Congress has continued to include the same
funding restriction in the annual appropriations bill for the
Justice Department.
IV. POLITICAL REALISM: LOOKING AT WHY MARIJUANA
LEGALIZATION HAS FAILED AND ITS LESSONS
As discussed, given the changing attitudes toward drug policy
and criminal justice, the changing state landscape on marijuana,
and the popularity of legalizing it (at least medical purposes), it
would seem that the time would be ripe for Congress to respond by
amending the CSA, particularly in the Democratic-controlled
House. Indeed, a key committee chairman claimed that marijuana
legalization would be one of the first items on the majority’s
agenda,202 but a month later, the Republican ranking member of
197 See Natalie Fertig et al., Advocates ask Pelosi, Hoyer to press pause on cannabis
banking, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2019, 5:47 AM), http://www.politico.com/newsletters/morningcannabis-preview/2019/09/18/advocates-ask-pelosi-hoyer-to-press-pause-on-cannabis-banking478449 [http://perma.cc/4JTP-FFH9]; see also Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et
al., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, and Steny Hoyer, Majority
Leader, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 17, 2019), http://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000016d41d0-db25-a77d-5fd3acdc0000 [http://perma.cc/YVV5-72WW].
198 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005).
199 Kamin, supra note 194, at 628–30 (discussing initial inconsistencies in the Obama
Justice Department toward prosecution of marijuana cases).
200 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. to U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013).
201 The amendment passed the House by a 219 to 189 vote on May 30, 2014, and was
subsequently included in Section 538 of Division B (Commerce-Justice-Science) of the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 P.L. 113–235.
202 Kyle Jaeger, House Will Vote To End Federal Marijuana Prohibition Within ‘Weeks,’
Key Chairman Says, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Mar. 27, 2019), http://www.marijuanamoment.net/
house-will-vote-to-end-federal-marijuana-prohibition-within-weeks-key-chairman-says/
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the House Judiciary Committee complained of the lack of progress
on the issue.203
Yet, change has only happened at the margins on the federal
level, such as turning a blind eye to states’ legalization activities.
Here, I try to offer a few reasons why this process is so difficult,
even under the best of circumstances.
A. Is the Public Ahead of Politicians?
Given the polling,204 observers might assume that the public is
ahead of policymakers in being ready to advance marijuana
legalization. This issue polls well in the general public, and when
presented as a ballot measure, bypassing the politicians, legalization
efforts have generally, but not always, been successful.205
But there are important caveats to this political assumption.
First, ballot measures may fail to address some of the complex,
historical issues related to equity that might be better handled
through legislation. Even more telling, several states with
progressive political environments have failed to pass legislation to
legalize marijuana, suggesting that there still remain many barriers
based on law, policy, politics, and equity that remain unresolved.
High profile failures in New Jersey and New York are not necessarily
about legalization itself, as that simple question—should adults be
able to consume marijuana legally?—generally had common
agreement in those legislatures. Rather, it is the more complex issue
of whether communities that have been devastated by the legacy of
the CSA should be able to share in the economic benefits that legal
sales might bring.206

[http://perma.cc/BC3L-Z8PR] (interviewing House Rules Chairman, Jim McGovern, who
predicted a vote on legislation to grant states an exemption from the CSA “in a relatively short
time, within the next several weeks”).
203 Tom Angell, Top GOP Congressman Presses Democratic Majority To Pass
Marijuana Bill, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2019, 10:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/
2019/04/04/top-gop-congressman-presses-democratic-majority-to-pass-marijuana-bill/
#1ef04b88faa9 [http://perma.cc/QZ5P-8G4P].
204 Hartig & Geiger, supra note 13.
205 See, e.g., Tom Angell, Marijuana Won The Midterm Elections, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2018,
11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/11/07/marijuana-won-the-midtermelections/#453589c93a91 [http://perma.cc/8W7F-BQFD] (“[O]ne clear winner in the midterm
elections was marijuana.”). But see North Dakota Measure 3, Marijuana Legalization and
Automatic Expungement Initiative, supra note 183 (noting the failure of a referendum in
North Dakota).
206 Wang, supra note 190 (noting a disagreement between legislators and the New
York governor over how to invest any revenue derived from recreational sales with one
legislator arguing, “I’m not willing to create a market that will allow existing wealthy
people to gain wealth and leave out the people that I represent.”).
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Second, while polling suggests general support, there are
differences based on partisan identification and religious
affiliation that make it less likely that Republicans would
support legalization efforts.207 For instance, a 2018 Pew poll
found that, while the overall public supported legalization 62% to
34%, Republicans were far less likely to support it than
Democrats and even independents who generally leaned in favor
of Republican policies.208 Further, white Evangelicals and
Catholics were more likely to oppose legalization while
“mainline” Protestants and unaffiliated individuals were more
likely to support it.209 Similarly, a poll in New York, shortly after
the legalization effort failed, found that, while a majority of the
public (55% to 40%) supported such a policy, most Republican
voters opposed it (40% to 53%).210
Thus, while states may be reforming their marijuana laws,
those activities have not necessarily translated to an active debate
in Congress.211 In part, that is because the means of pursuing policy
change are not the same at the federal level as in the states.212
B. Difficulties Building an Evidence Base for Policy Changes
Another issue is that policy decisions around marijuana are
often being made without strong scientific evidence because of how
the CSA classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug. Rather, states
are looking at other states’ experiences with marijuana
legalization to learn about best practices and unforeseen issues.213
207 See, e.g., Warmbrodt, supra note 196 (noting that Banking Committee Chairman
Crapo is open to considering legislation allowing banks to work with marijuana
businesses, but does not support amending the CSA to legalize marijuana).
208 Hartig & Geiger, supra note 13 (“Republicans are divided, with 45% in favor of
legalizing marijuana and 51% opposed. Still, the share of Republicans saying marijuana should
be legal has increased from 39% in 2015. Independents who lean toward the Republican Party
are far more likely than Republicans to favor marijuana legalization (59% vs. 45%).”).
209 Id. (surveying Evangelicals (52% opposed, 43% support), Catholics (44% opposed,
52% support), white mainline Protestants (31% opposed, 64% support), unaffiliated (19% opposed,
79% support)).
210 Voters on End of Session Agenda: ‘Yes’ on Marijuana (55-40%), SIENA C. RES. INST.
(June 10, 2019), http://scri.siena.edu/2019/06/10/voters-on-end-of-session-agenda-yes-onmarijuana-55-40/ [http://perma.cc/8UFY-93BJ].
211 Collective state action may be the catalyst for change at the federal level. See, e.g.,
Kim, supra note 16, at 102 (discussing how, after a majority of states passed language
authorizing a “right to try” experimental drugs, Congress entered into the policy space to
pass a federal version of such a “right”).
212 Ferraiolo, supra note 22, at 171 (“Policy change in the states has not led to federal
reform. Rather, two factors—the ballot initiative (which provided a means for public
opinion to be heard and invoked) and policy entrepreneurs’ framing efforts (which
emphasized a medical, compassionate image of marijuana and its users)—have allowed
the coexistence of two different policy images and approaches.”).
213 J.B. Wogan, For This Pot Guy, States Are His Biggest Customers, GOVERNING
(Aug. 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/mgmt/gov-marijuana-colorado-andrew-
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But while the economics of legalization are becoming better
known, the CSA restricts research. The National Academy of
Medicine (“NAM”) noted in a literature review:
[The] growing acceptance, accessibility, and use of cannabis and its
derivatives have raised important public health concerns. Moreover, the
lack of any aggregated knowledge of cannabis-related health effects has
led to uncertainty about what, if any, are the harms or benefits from its
use. . . . As laws and policies continue to change, research must also.214

Efforts to expand medical research are slowly moving forward
in response to the NAM concern. In 2016, the DEA called for
applications from marijuana growers to become licensed
medical researchers.215 Approval of these applications stalled
under then-Attorney General Sessions,216 but Attorney General
Barr since has announced that the DEA has resumed reviewing
the applications.217 Some hope that other parts of the federal
government are taking actions that suggest they may becoming
more receptive to marijuana research.218
Such research could be useful in validating prior studies, helping
consumers,219 and making informed policy decisions—especially
freedman-states-regulation.html [http://perma.cc/H5WT-C29T] (“[A]fter voters approve a
marijuana measure, officials look for advice from the few places with some experience in
taxing and regulating legal marijuana” with Colorado “field[ing] calls from more than 25
states asking for guidance.”).
214 Nearly
100 Conclusions on the Health Effects of Marijuana and
Cannabis-Derived Products Presented in New Report, N AT’L A CAD. S CI. (Jan. 12,
2017), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=24625
[http://perma.cc/2BHG-LCX2].
215 Applications To Become Registered Under the Controlled Substances Act To
Manufacture Marijuana To Supply Researchers in the United States, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 81 Fed. Reg. 53846 (Aug. 12, 2016).
216 See Jeffrey Miron, Jeff Sessions Stonewalls Permission for Medical Marijuana
Research, CATO INST. (July 12, 2018, 11:30 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/jeff-sessionsstonewalls-permission-medical-marijuana-research [http://perma.cc/3WSK-33UL].
217 Sara Brittany Somerset, The DEA Is Rewriting Obama’s Federal Cannabis
Regulations, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2019, 2:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sarabrittanysomerset/
2019/08/28/the-dea-has-rewritten-obamas-federal-cannabis-regulations/#6d7701553dae
[http://perma.cc/9TG3-MAVM] (noting the difficulties in qualifying because manufacturers
that already process marijuana in state-licensed arrangements cannot become federally
qualified producers).
218 Compare Hoffmann, supra note 52 (“[T]he first time that the FDA has found the
marijuana plant, in this case an extract, has an accepted medical use.”), with Jerome Adams,
Marijuana Use & the Developing Brain, HHS (Aug. 29, 2019), http://www.hhs.gov/
surgeongeneral/reports-and-publications/addiction-and-substance-misuse/advisory-on-marijuanause-and-developing-brain/index.html [http://perma.cc/74LM-CNWN] (“Science-based messaging
campaigns and targeted prevention programming are urgently needed to ensure that risks are
clearly communicated and amplified by local, state, and national organizations.”).
219 See, e.g., Bridget Small, Serious health claims for CBD products need proof, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION CONSUMER INFO. (Sept. 10, 2019), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2019/
09/serious-health-claims-cbd-products-need-proof?utm_source=govdelivery [http://perma.cc/5BT93CCB] (issuing a warning against three companies for making health claims about products
containing cannabidiol (“CBD”), a chemical compound derived from the cannabis plant).
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policymakers looking to amend marijuana policy as a means of
addressing the opioid epidemic. For instance, in 2014,
researchers found:
States with medical cannabis laws had a 24.8% lower mean annual
opioid overdose mortality rate . . . compared with states without
medical cannabis laws. Examination of the association between
medical cannabis laws and opioid analgesic overdose mortality in each
year after implementation of the law showed that such laws were
associated with a lower rate of overdose mortality that generally
strengthened over time . . . .220

The study became widely used in justifying legalization, not only
domestically, but even internationally.221 Others, though, argue
that “marijuana is a companion drug rather than substitution
drug and that marijuana use may be contributing to the opioid
epidemic rather than improving it”—something that could be
worrisome if ultimately correct.222 Thus, reflecting the 2017 NAM
position, some researchers worried:
For many reasons, ranging from significant barriers to research on
cannabis and cannabinoids to impatience, cannabis policy has raced
ahead of cannabis science in the United States. For science to guide
policy, funding the aforementioned studies must be a priority at the
federal and state level. Many companies and states (via taxes) are
profiting from the cannabis industry while failing to support research
at the level necessary to advance the science. This situation has to
change to get definitive answers on the possible role for cannabis in
the opioid crisis, as well as the other potential harms and benefits of
legalizing cannabis.223

C. Different Faces Produce Different Laws and Policies
The prior two sections raised some fundamental questions
about the legacy of the CSA and our country’s approach to the
opioid epidemic and lingering resistance to reforming marijuana
policy. At a time when policymakers seem to be more sympathetic

220 Marcus A. Bachhuber et al., Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic Overdose
Mortality in the United States, 1999-2010, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1668, 1668 (2014).
221 Brittany Flaherty, Legalizing medical cannabis reduces opioid overdose deaths? Not
so fast, new study says, STAT (June 10, 2019), http://www.statnews.com/2019/06/10/
legalizing-medical-marijuana-opioid-overdose-deaths/ [http://perma.cc/552B-YDZ3] (quoting
a researcher in Australia that the 2014 study has “been cited in my own country as
compelling evidence that medical cannabis reduces opioid overdose deaths”).
222 Kenneth Finn, Why Marijuana Will Not Fix the Opioid Epidemic, 115 MO. MED.
191, 193 (2018), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6140166/pdf/ms115_p0191.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CF29-GYFL].
223 Kevin P. Hill et al., The Role of Cannabis Legalization in the Opioid Crisis, 178
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 679, 680 (2018).

Do Not Delete

160

5/22/20 8:52 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 23:1

to addiction issues and rethinking sentencing for drug offenses, why
has it proven difficult to rethink the CSA’s approach to marijuana?
The same issues continue to repeat themselves: there is a
segment of society that is uncomfortable with the criminalization
of drug use and addiction, just as there is a segment of society
that associates drug use with criminal elements and deviant
behavior.224 Moreover, there is a long history of associating those
criminal elements with the poor, minorities, and the youth, and
this history parallels the move to amend the CSA towards a law
enforcement approach rather than a public health approach.225
In this light, CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST STEP seem like
an aberration, not a change in course, because the policy
response is due to the face of who was affected initially by the
opioid epidemic: an older, whiter, and male demographic.226
Additionally, many of these individuals became addicted, not by
choice, but because of failures in our healthcare system. Adding
to this sympathy, some conservative commentators wrote:
America’s nationwide opioid epidemic has not been accompanied by a
nationwide crime wave (excepting of course the apparent explosion of
illicit heroin use). Just the opposite: As best can be told, national
victimization rates for violent crimes and property crimes have both
reportedly dropped by about two-thirds over the past two decades.227

V. CONCLUSION
It is true that many of the contenders for the Democratic
presidential nomination support legalization of marijuana, and
thus could try to initiate the regulatory process in order to change
how it is regulated under the CSA.228 But in looking at this
224 SPILLANE, supra note 17, at 23 (“[T]wo general and competing models
emerge¾the ‘deviance’ and ‘victimization’ models of drug abuse.”).
225

To the extent that drug offenders are perceived negatively, undeserving of
assistance, and deserving of punishment, drug policies are likely to reflect and
perpetuate these sentiments. Insofar as the population identified with drug use
overlaps with other populations—racial minorities and the poor—who are already
viewed as threatening to social order, then punitive policies can appear justified.
Neill, supra note 64, at 377.
226 Rudd, supra note 76, at 1450 tbl.2.
227 Eberstadt, supra note 118. But see German Lopez, Why the opioid epidemic may
have fueled America’s murder spike, VOX (Feb. 6, 2018, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2018/2/6/16934054/opioid-epidemic-murder-violent-crime [http://perma.cc/PR6G4JMB] (noting that as the opioid epidemic shifts from prescription drug misuse to use of
illicit drugs, such as heroin, it may be related to an increase in the murder rate because of
violence associated with illegal drug trafficking).
228 See Paul Demko et al., How Democrats are failing on legalized marijuana,
POLITICO (May 19, 2019, 7:15 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/19/democratsmarijuana-legalization-1331710 [http://perma.cc/DNA9-4NW7] (noting that the overwhelming
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exercise as a matter of a legislative initiative for purposes of this
symposium, the bottom line, of course, is whether change will occur
via Congress. Does the passage of CARA, SUPPORT, and FIRST
STEP mean something for marijuana reform and a return to the
bipartisan compromise that the CSA was initially built upon?
In looking at the politics behind those bills, I would answer
no. Personally, I do believe that the tide is turning on reforming
federal law and policy related to marijuana, but as I have argued
here, I believe while change is in the future, I do not believe
change—particularly if we focus solely on change via Congress—is
on the immediate policy horizon yet. Despite well-welcomed
changes in the politics and public perception of addiction, these
are not enough yet to overcome well-worn attitudes and
presumptions in law and politics.

majority of candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination, as of July 1, 2019,
support some sort of legalization process).

